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THE ARBITRARY PATH OF DUE PROCESS
HARRY F. TEPKER, JR.*
"Due process," one of the most familiar of legal phrases, is a promise of our
culture's legal tradition. In the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States, the people exercised their original will to define fundamental
rules restricting the governments of the Union to insist that no person shall suffer
loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.' Yet, for scholars,
students, lawyers, and judges, "[d]ue process doctrine subsists in confusion,"2
perhaps because it grew far beyond its original dimensions and purposes. Virtually
unknown to most citizens, and not so well known to those learned in law, is that
due process has been transformed. Interpretation may seem strange to anyone who
concludes, sensibly, that the words of the due process clauses suggest that the
guarantee is primarily concerned with procedure - that is, the methods and the
manner by which government officers act in the execution and enforcement of the
law.
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis,' the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
concluded that legal doctrines rooted in due process have little or nothing to say
about the fate of a sixteen-year-old boy killed by a deputy sheriffs vehicle in a
high-speed police chase. The case is a landmark in the transformation of due
process that may be little noted, nor long remembered. Still, the case may be
significant as a "periodic" reminder, deemed necessary by John Hart Ely, "that
'substantive due process' is a contradiction in terms - sort of like 'green pastel
redness."'4
This article questions whether constitutional doctrine adequately account for the
Supreme Court's preference for close scrutiny of legislation, while all but abdicating
a role when human life is taken because of arbitrary, thoughtless action. Part I
discusses Lewis. Part II focuses on a controversial element of due process doctrine,
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the "conscience-shocking" language of Rochin v. California' that developed into
something of a test for judicial review of alleged police misconduct reaffirmed in
Lewis. Part III traces the theme of "substantive due process" that governmental
action must be rational. Next, this article suggests that the traditional insistence on
rationality would better protect citizens from arbitrary police behavior, while
allowing for reasonable police discretion to deal with an emergency.
L County of Sacramento v. Lewis
The facts of Lewis followed a tragically familiar pattern. After two sheriffs
deputies responded to a call, they observed a motorcycle approaching at high speed.
It was operated by an eighteen-year-old and carried a sixteen-year-old passenger.
The officers ordered the boys to stop, to no avail. The boys recklessly fled at high
speed, and one of the officers pursued, in apparent conscious disregard of the
department's policy against such police chases. The end came when the speeding
motorcycle tipped over as the driver attempted a sharp left turn. The older boy was
thrown clear, but the younger was luckless. The officer slammed on his brakes. The
patrol car skidded into the 16 year old. The boy was pronounced dead at the scene.
The boy's parents brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the county,
the sheriffs department, and the pursuing officer. They alleged that the officer's
conduct deprived the boy of life without due process. The district court granted
summary judgment for defendants. Dismissing the claim against the officer, the
court reasoned that even if he had violated the Constitution, he was entitled to
qualified immunity. No state or federal opinion published prior to the alleged
misconduct held that a law enforcement officer violated principles of substantive
due process by engaging in a high speed pursuit, even if the officer violated state
law or police regulations.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It took a position that was,
to say the least, unusual among the circuits.6 The appellate court held that "the
appropriate degree of fault to be applied to high-speed police pursuits is deliberate
indifference to, or reckless disregard for, a person's right to life and personal
security."7
The U.S. Supreme Court confronted the issue, as Justice Souter phrased it,
"whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless indifference
5. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
6. Compare Lewis v. Sacramento County, 98 F.3d 434, 441 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying "deliberate
indifference" or "reckless disregard"), with Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1038 (1st Cir. 1996) ("shocks
the conscience"), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1210 (1997); Williams v. Denver City, 99 F.3d 1009, 1014-15
(10th Cir. 1996) (same); Fagan v. Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1306-07 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (same);
Terkin v. Frederick County Comnm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 720 (4th Cir. 1991) (same), cert, denied, 502 U.S.
1095 (1992); Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1986) (same); compare also, e.g., Jones v.
Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying "gross negligence" standard for imposing liability
for harm caused by police pursuit) with Foy v. Berea, 58 F.3d 227, 230 (6th Cir. 1995) (disavowing the
notion that "gross negligence is sufficient to support a substantive due process claim").
7. Lewis v. Sacramento County, 98 F.3d 434, 441 (9th Cir. 1996).
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to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected
offender."' The Court answered no. Justice Souter's explanation was a test for
future claims of the same type: "[I]n such circumstances only a purpose to cause
harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary
conduct shocking to the conscience, necessary for a due process violation."9
A majority of the Court joined Justice Souter's primer on due process. The
opinion reaffirmed prior decisions that the due process clauses "guarante[e] more
than fair process" in the application and enforcement of law." The "substantive
sphere" of due process bars "certain government actions regardless of the fairness
of the procedures used to implement them."" However, this substantive due
process case challenged not the policy of a state statute, but the individual conduct
of a law enforcement officer. Specifically, as Justice Souter summarized the
plaintiffs theory, the officer's "actions in causing Lewis's death were an abuse of
executive power so clearly unjustified by any legitimate objective of law enfor-
cement as to be barred by the Fourteenth Amendment."'2
The Lewis opinion divides due process's "protection of the individual against
arbitrary action of government,"'3 into three parts. Category one is the familiar
concept of "procedural due process," which ensures against "denial of fundamental
procedural fairness,"'" and generally focuses on the conduct of the courts or other
agencies performing adjudicatory functions.
Category two, in turn, is subdivided into two parts of its own, which focus on the
exercise of state or federal governmental power lacking "any reasonable justification
in the service of a legitimate governmental objective":" (a) challenges against
legislation and (b) challenges against executive action. After performing this initial
analytical classification, the Court announced that "criteria to identify what is fatally
arbitrary differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a
governmental officer that is at issue."'6 As many of the classic, controversial
"substantive due process" cases show, the Court remains ready and willing to
intervene against the work of legislatures if statutes burden fundamental values or
if they reflect hysteria or irrationality. The full range of judicial scrutiny is the
standard for the laws written by ordinary political processes. The federal courts are
to be suspicious, skeptical, or deferential depending on whether a law threatens a
8. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 840 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997)).
11. Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 845 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
14. Id. at 845-46 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) (applying procedural due process
to arbitrary takings)).
15. Id. at 846 (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331) (stating that substantive due process protects against
government's arbitrary and oppressive exercise of power).
16. Id.
2000]
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fundamental right or merely an ordinary liberty interest. In any case, government's
legislative actions cannot be arbitrary, which means a statute must be rational.17
Executive action, however, need not be rational; it need only be behavior other
than murder, torture, or other abuse shocking to the judicial conscience. "[O]nly the
most egregious official conduct can be said to be 'arbitrary in the constitutional
sense...".8 The Court seems to be both clear and united on this point. The Court
does not seek, and will not permit, federal judicial supervision of all executive
officers of all governments of the Union. And so, the Court adhered to its much-
criticized view that only "conscience-shocking" executive action will offend the
substantive component of the due process guarantee." At least, the standard is a
long-standing one, as Justice Souter explained:
To this end, for half a century now we have spoken of the cognizable
level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the conscience.
We first put the test this way in Rochin v. California,f[] ... where we
found the forced pumping of a suspect's stomach enough to offend due
process as conduct "that shocks the conscience" and violates the
"decencies of civilized conduct."[' ] .... Most recently, in Collins v.
Harker Heights,[-2 ] ... we said again that the substantive component
of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only when it
"can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in
a constitutional sense." While the measure of what is conscience-
shocking is no calibrated yard stick, it does, as Judge Friendly put it,
"poin[t] the way."'
As applied to the police chase situation in Lewis, proof that an officer had violated
prevailing departmental safety procedures was not enough. Neither was proof that
the officer acted with "deliberate or reckless indifference to life."'u In the Court's
words, "in such circumstances only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the
legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to
the conscience, necessary for a due process violation."'
17. See id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
18. Id. (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992)).
19. Id.
20. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
21. Justice Souter cited a number of cases decided after Rochin. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (substantive due process principles prevents government from engaging in
conduct that shocks the conscience); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (same); Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957) (due process bars misconduct that "'shocked the conscience' and was
so 'brutal' and 'offensive! that it did not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency").
22. 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992).
23. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846-47 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
24. Id. at 852.
25. Id. at 836.
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In defense of the Court's reluctance, Justice Souter quoted the famous dictum of
Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland:' "[I]t is a constitution we
are expounding."'  Marshall's dictum - sometimes described as the most
important sentence among all of the Court's opinions, but also as authority of last
resort when the Court intends to ignore text, history, and precedent' - obscures
the more specific reasons for the Court's decision.
The Court understands that "the constitutional concept of conscience-shocking
duplicates no traditional category of common-law fault."' It is not at all certain
whether the Court wants the law to be clear. After all, according to Justice Souter,
the concept "points clearly away from liability, or clearly toward it, only at the ends
of the tort law's spectrum of culpability."" What does seem certain is that the
Court does not want to transform the concept of substantive due process into "a
body of constitutional law imposing liability whenever someone cloaked with state
authority causes harm." 2
The Court's primary motivation appears to be respect for federalism and the
separate constitutional existence of the States. The Court pointed to Paul v.
Davis, in which the Court resisted expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment and
its Due Process Clause into a "font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever
systems may already be administered by the States."' The Court also quoted
Daniels v. Williams: "Our Constitution deals with the large concerns of the
governors and the governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort law
in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living
together in society."" So, as the Justices recognized in Lewis, the CouTt "rejected
the lowest common denominator of customary tort liability as any mark of
sufficiently shocking conduct."' These principles mean "the Constitution does not
guarantee due care on the part of state officials."31 Also, "liability for negligently
26. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
27. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) and
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
28. Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARv. L. REV. 217,219 (1955).
29. Compare, e.g., Phillip Kurland, Curia Regis: Some Comments on the Divine Right of Kings and
Courts to Say What the Law Is, 23 ARmz. L. REv. 582, 591 (1981), with National Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 647 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Precisely because 'it is
a constitution we are expounding,' we ought not to take liberties with it.") and Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 853 (1989) (Marshall's dictum is not authority
for nonoriginalist or broad interpretation of Constitution).
30. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
34. Id. at 701.
35. 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).
36. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848-49 (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) and Davidson v. Cannon,
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inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due
process."'"
After setting aside traditional tort standards because they would be too intrusive,
the Justices focused on "behavior at the other end of the culpability spectrum that
would most probably support a substantive due process claim." 39 In the Court's
view, the touchstone of constitutional responsibility is intentional misconduct. The
seminal case is Rochin, which the Court identified as "the case in which we
formulated and first applied the shocks-the-conscience test."' The Court sees
Rochin as a prototype for its approach, though the case does not quite live up to the
specific standard articulated by the Court for police chase cases. As the Court
admitted in Rochin, "[i1t was not the ultimate purpose of the government actors to
harm the plaintiff,"'" at least not for reasons unrelated to a legitimate police
purpose. The police officers "apparently acted with full appreciation of what the
Court described as the brutality of their acts."4" The Court hedged its explanations
by saying such deliberately harmful action is "most likely . . . to rise to the
conscience-shocking level." 3 Still, though the Court appears to be willing to apply
an even more demanding standard than Rochin, it found in the landmark case the
portents and roots of an intentional misconduct standard. Rochin's result and
language - if not, the holding" - were enough to confirm the Justices' historical
sense that "this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions
of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property."4s
The essential lesson of Lewis appears to be that the Court wants to reduce
potential litigation over the "closer calls" when "injuries are produced with
culpability'falling within the middle range [of theoretical tort liability], following
from something more than negligence but 'less than intentional conduct, such as
recklessness or "gross negligence...'..' The Court distinguished cases in which the
State would have special duties because it held persons in custody.47
Rules of due process are not... subject to mechanical application in
unfamiliar territory. Deliberate indifference that shocks in one environ-
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 849 n.9.
41. I1&
42. Id.
43. Id. at 849.
44. See discussion infra Part II.
45. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
46. 1d.
47. Id. at 849-50. Justice Souter cited and discussed several cases. See, e.g., City of Revere v.
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (explaining that "the due process rights of a
[pretrial detainee] are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted
prisoner" (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16, 545 (1979)); Barrie v. Grand County, Utah,
119 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 1997) (deliberate indifference of prison officials to medical needs of
prisoners may violate Eighth Amendment and must also be enough to satisfy the fault requirement for
due process claims based on the medical needs of someone jailed while awaiting trial); Weyant v. Okst,
101 F.3d 845, 856 (2nd Cir. 1996) (same).
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ment may not be so patently egregious in another, and our concern with
preserving the constitutional proportions of substantive due process
demands an exact analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power
is condemned as conscience-shocking. 4
This language appears to be designed first to preserve a more demanding standard
of care imposed on government in custodial cases, but also to preserve a broader
flexibility in substantive due process cases generally. Justice Souter quoted from
Betts v. Brady, a seminal case on the issue of procedure:
The phrase [due process of law] formulates a concept less rigid and
more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter of rule.
Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in
a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of
fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in
other circumstances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short
of such denial.'
Such language echoes the flexible formula embraced by Justice John Harlan in
Griswold v. Connecticut"' and resurrected in Justice Souter's opinion in the so-
called "right-to-die" case.' However, the Court's hedging language is easier to
highlight than its explanations for its specific ruling in the police chase case. To be
sure, the Court sees cases of normal pretrial custody and high-speed law enfor-
cement chases as presenting "markedly different circumstances" than custody cases
or its other decisions to intervene against the fruits of ordinary legislative
deliberation. Deliberate indifference shocks the judicial conscience when imprison-
ment is at issue, because "forethought about an inmate's welfare is not only feasible
but obligatory under a regime that incapacitates a prisoner to exercise ordinary
responsibility for his own welfare." 3 Justice Souter also refers to DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services:'
[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there
against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty
to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.
The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the
affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that
it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to
provide for his basic human needs - e.g., food, clothing, shelter,
48. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850.
49. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
50. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850.
51. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
52. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
53. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851.
54. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
2000]
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medical care, and reasonable safety - it transgresses the substantive
limits on state action set by the. . . Due Process Clause."
The Court in Lewis also believed that the custodial situation was unusual, in that it
did not involve "any substantial countervailing interest."' Neglect of a prisoner's
medical care, for example, does not conflict with other governmental interests
(except, of course, budgetary).' On the other hand, the Court hints that it is not
even sure that "it makes sense to speak of indifference as deliberate in the case of
sudden pursuit."'
The Court wants to preserve a reasonable measure of executive discretion for
emergency and other situations when deliberation is difficult and second-guessing
is all too easy. The Justices prefer that "a much higher standard of fault than
deliberate indifference has to be shown for officer liability in a prison riot." 9
Specifically, a victim of governmental use of force or violence should depend on
"whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline
or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."'  By
analogy, the standard for police liability in car chases is similar.
Like prison officials facing a riot, the police on an occasion calling for
fast action have obligations that tend to tug against each other. Their
duty is to restore and maintain lawful order, while not exacerbating
disorder more than necessary to do their jobs. They are supposed to act
decisively and to show restraint at the same moment, and their decisions
have to be made "in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the
luxury of a second chance."... A police officer deciding whether to
give chase must balance on one hand the need to stop a suspect and
show that flight from the law is no way to freedom, and, on the other,
the high-speed threat to everyone within stopping range, be they
suspects, their passengers, other drivers, or bystanders."
As a rationale and explanation for its decision that the "conscience-shocking"
language is the appropriate approach to the facts of Lewis, the Court's analogy
between the prison riot and the police chase seems to be all there is.
55. Id at 199-200 (citation and footnote omitted).
56. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851.
57. See id at 852 ("Mhe State's responsibility to attend to the medical needs of prisoners [or
detainees] does not ordinarily clash with other equally important governmental responsibilities." (quoting
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986))); see also, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319-
25 (1982) (holding that personnel at a mental institution violated the due process rights of a severely
retarded person by falling to exercise professional judgment and by denying him training and
habilitation).
58. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853.
59. Id. at 852-53.
60. Id at 853 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. at 320-21).
61. Id (internal citations omitted).
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Just as a purpose to cause harm is needed for Eighth Amendment
liability in a riot case, so it ought to be needed for Due Process liability
in a pursuit case. Accordingly, we hold that high-speed chases with no
intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do not
give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment, redressable by
an action under [section] 1983.
The Court explained that the plaintiffs allegations against police authorities in
Lewis were rooted in versions of negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, or
"conscious disregard" of duty. And mistakes, even serious mistakes, in times of
emergency are not enough to shock the judicial conscience, as the Court explained:
[The officer] was faced with a course of lawless behavior for which the
police were not to blame. They had done nothing to cause [the motor
cycle operator's] high-speed driving in the first place, nothing to excuse
his flouting of the commonly understood law enforcement authority to
control traffic, and nothing (beyond a refusal to call off the chase) to
encourage him to race through traffic at breakneck speed forcing other
drivers out of their travel lanes. [The operator's] outrageous behavior
was practically instantaneous, and so was [the officer's] instinctive
response. While prudence would have repressed the reaction, the
officer's instinct was to do his job as a law enforcement officer, not to
induce [the operator's] lawlessness, or to terrorize, cause harm, or kill.
Prudence, that is, was subject to countervailing enforcement con-
siderations, and while [the officer] exaggerated their demands, there is
no reason to believe that they were tainted by an improper or malicious
motive on his part.'
In short, it mattered not whether the police officer was reasonable (or rational);
whether his conduct offended the duties imposed by the laws of tort; or whether the
officer's judgment passed muster in light of "law enforcement's own codes of sound
practice."' The chase of a speeding suspect did not "shock the conscience"
because it was not intended to harm. For the Justices, that factual conclusion ended
the need for constitutional analysis under due process and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
II. The Conscience-Shocking "Test"
After Lewis, the story of the "conscience-shocking" language may be only a
matter of historical interest, but it reflects the uncertainty and subjectivity of the
Court's constitutional analysis of "substantive due process." Before Lewis, there was
good reason to doubt that the Rochin "shock the conscience" language was a
definitive test for any case. Few would question the basic objective of Lewis that
the doctrines of American constitutionalism must make some allowance for
62. Id. at 854.
63. Id. at 855.
64. Id.
20001
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reasonable, good-faith judgments of police officers and other executive officials who
are forced to cope with emergency. However, there seems to be a gap in the Court's
reasoning in Lewis. It does follow that the "conscience-shocking" language is the
best way to balance the competing claims of order and legal obligations to the rights
of the individual. Even in Rochin, the Court used the "shock the conscience"
language not as a definition of "arbitrary" governmental conduct, but as a way of
explaining its unwillingness to "afford brutality the cloak of law."' A close
reading of Rochin reveals that the Supreme Court never required proof of conduct
that "shocks the conscience" as an essential element for a substantive due process
violation. Instead, the Court used the phrase only to express outrage:
[T]he proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more
than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism
about combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks
the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the
struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible
extraction of his stomach's contents - this course of proceeding by
agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even
hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and the
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.'
In short, the Court saw Rochin as an unusual case, not as a landmark delineating
boundaries between permissible and impermissible conduct. Proof of conscience-
shocking conduct justified judicial intervention to overturn a conviction, because a
judicial sanction of brutal conduct "would... discredit law and... brutalize the
temper of a society."' The Court never said that such proof was essential.
Although Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court contains an illuminating
analysis of the origins and evolution of due process, it appeared that the holding or
the well-known "conscience-shocking" language did not endure as a test for
deciding actual cases. The dual problems of vagueness and indefiniteness were
present at the creation in Rochin, as Justice Frankfurter conceded.' Justice Douglas
concurred in the result and, apparently, with Justice Frankfurter's confession. He
could not join in the majority opinion, because the Rochin standard "is to make the
rule turn not on the Constitution but on the idiosyncrasies of the judges who sit
here."' Almost twenty years later, Justice Black argued:
With a 'shocks the conscience' test of constitutionality, citizens must
guess what is the law, guess what a majority of nine judges will believe
fair and reasonable. Such a test wilfully throws away the certainty and
65. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
66. Id at 172.
67. Id at 174.
68. d at 172.
69. Id. at 179.
[Vol. 53:197
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol53/iss2/3
ARBITRARY PATH OF DUE PROCESS
security that lies in a written constitution, one that does not alter with
a judge's health, belief or his politics.'
To be sure, the Court used the phrase on rare occasions, though never as a
decisive standard to explain the limits of a government's duty under the Due Process
Clause. As Judge Cowen pointed out in his exhaustive dissenting opinion in Fagan
v. City of Vineland,7 "Since Rochin, the Supreme Court has never employed the
'shocks the conscience' test as part of its holding in any case."' His statement was
historically accurate until Lewis.
In Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas,' a case often cited as reaffinring
the Rochin language, the Supreme Court addressed the question "whether... 42
U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for a municipal employee who is fatally injured
in the course of his employment because the city customarily failed to train or warn
its employees about known hazards in the workplace."7' Plaintiffs argued, first,
"that the Federal Constitution imposes a duty on the city to provide its employees
with minimal levels of safety and security."75 Second, "the city's 'deliberate
indifference' to Collins' safety was arbitrary government action that must 'shock the
conscience! of federal judges."'76 Collins did not hold that federal courts must use
the "shock the conscience" standard to evaluate government actions that threaten or
injure persons in violation of substantive due process principles. The Court ruled
only that the Federal Constitution imposed no duty on the city to provide employees
with minimal levels of safety and security in the workplace' The Collins Court
summarized its view with only a passing reference to the Rochin language:
We . . . are not persuaded that the city's alleged failure to train its
employees, or to warn them about known risks of harm, was an
omission that can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience
shocking, in a constitutional sense. Petitioner's claim is analogous to a
fairly typical state-law tort claim: The city breached its duty of care to
her husband by failing to provide a safe work environment. Because the
Due Process Clause "does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in
laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend
living together in society," Daniels v. Williams,r7] . . . we have
previously rejected claims that the Due Process Clause should be
interpreted to impose federal duties that are analogous to those
traditionally imposed by state tort law.'
70. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 393 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
71. 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994).
72. Id. at 1316.
73. 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
74. Id. at 117.
75. Id at 126.
76. Id at 127.
77. See id at 126.
78. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
79. Collins, 503 U.S. at 128.
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In short, as the Court said, plaintiffs allegations, if proved, were not "arbitrary" or
"conscience-shocking" because they amount only to allegations "analogous to a
fairly typical state-law tort claim. ' Importantly, the essence of the Court's
analysis in Collins was that the city's conduct was a mere omission, not an
affirmative act. Thus, Collins added little or nothing to Daniels. "There was no
occasion for the Collins Court to consider the implication of conduct that shocks the
conscience. Indeed, there was no need to provide a new rule regarding conduct that
is more culpable than mere omission."'" Of equal significance is the fact that the
Court emphasized that the plaintiff did not allege either a specific intent to harm or
reckless intent.' From a full reading of the Court's language and context, it seems
unlikely that the Court intended to endorse the "conscience-shocking" formula as
a test for arbitrary conduct, or that it intended to use the phrase "conscience-
shocking" as the long-awaited answer to the questions left open in Daniels. A far
more plausible interpretation is that the Court was saying only that the plaintiffs
allegations in Collins failed to establish her own theory of last resort. Other
language in Collins placed the issue of arbitrary deprivations in the context of the
traditional standards of judicial deference and the rational basis test. The presence
of rational justification is the basis for the Supreme Court's judgment in Collins that
the city was not "arbitrary in a constitutional sense."
Our refusal to characterize the city's alleged omission in this case as
arbitrary in a constitutional sense rests on the presumption that the ad-
ministration of government programs is based on a rational decision-
making process that takes account of competing social, political, and
economic forces.... Decisions concerning the allocation of resources
to individual programs, such as sewer maintenance, and to particular
aspects of those programs, such as the training and compensation of
employees, involve a host of policy choices that must be made by
locally elected representatives, rather than by federal judges interpreting
the basic charter of Government for the entire country. The Due
Process Clause "is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised
personnel decisions."'
Still later, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs claim of governmental deprivation
of a liberty interest with the explanation: "[S]he has not alleged that the deprivation
of this liberty interest was arbitrary in the constitutional sense."' Finally, the Court
summarized its holding as "the city's alleged failure to train and warn did not
constitute a constitutionally arbitrary deprivation of Collins' life."' Most often, the
Court uses only the term "arbitrary." Thus, "[i]f the Court's opinion is an indication
80. Id. at 128.
81. Fagan v. Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1312 (3rd Cir. 1994) (Cowen, J., dissenting).
82. See id.
83. Collins, 503 U.S. at 128-29 (citations omitted) (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350
(1976)).
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of any standard, that standard appears to be 'arbitrariness.""In Even after Collins,
substantive due process theory did not seem to depend on proof of conscience-
shocking conduct by government officials.'
Collins did not alter the longer tradition that proof of "arbitrary" governmental
action and proof of "conscience-shocking" governmental behavior were alternative
ways to establish a substantive due process violation." In short, proof of brutal or
sadistic conduct that "shocks the conscience" still might establish a substantive due
process claim, but, prior to Lewis, the Court had not said, or even hinted, that such
proof is required. Rochin's "shock the conscience" language might be more useful
and much clearer, if it was confined to cases in which a plaintiff does demonstrate
a state actor acted with malice or with a specific intent to injure or brutalize 9 Had
the Court taken this course in Lewis, proof of intentional brutality would be an
alternative, additional way to demonstrate culpability when proof approaches
specific intent or a criminal state of mind, as in Eighth Amendment cases.' On the
other hand, if the "conscience-shocking" language is the basic standard, and if the
Justices continue to use general terms - such as the plaintiff must show a "high
level of outrageousness"'" - the "test" will continue to be a vague, subjective,
almost undefinable formula.
Despite criticisms, many courts of appeals assumed the vitality of the
"conscience-shocking" test based on Rochin, Collins, and a few other brief snippets
of language. Nevertheless, the courts' reluctance and discomfort with the "test" was
clear. It was hard to find praise or even an overt defense of the Rochin language,
even when it was invoked. The First Circuit condemned it with faint praise as not
"mathematically precise."" The Third Circuit sitting en banc confessed that the
"shocks the conscience" test is "amorphous and imprecise."' And the Ninth Circuit
86. Pagan, 22 F.3d at 1312 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
87. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133-37 (1992) (noting involuntary administration
of antipsychotic drugs during course of trial to defendant); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80-83
(1992) (noting the statute that permits continuing confinement of person acquitted of crime by reason
of insanity based on findings of antisocial personality violates due process).
88. See id.
89. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 582 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding
substantive due process claim because police conduct would shock even an unusually jaded conscience);
Checki v. Webb, 785 F.2d 534,538 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding jury must decide whether police pursuit was
inspired by malice amounting to abuse of official power that shocks the conscience).
90. See, e.g., Hill v. Shobe, 93 F.3d 418, 421 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996) ("T]he Eighth Amendments
definition of 'criminal recklessness' is relevant in Fourteenth Amendment challenges under section
1983."); Salazar v. City of Chicago, 940 F.2d 233, 240 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[D]efinition of punishment is
just as relevant in the Fourteenth Amendment context as it is in the Eighth Amendment context.").
91. Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1995).
92. When used in other contexts, an "outrageousness" test also operates like language of tort law.
Worse, it has "an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the
basis of the juror's tastes or views." Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (holding First
Amendment violated, despite use of "outrageousness" standard to determine intentional infliction of
emotional distress because of tasteless satire of public figure).
93. Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1039 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S 1210 (1997).
94. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1308 (3rd Cir. 1994).
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described it as "troubling, subjective."' 5 In sum, before Lewis, even the courts that
felt bound to use the Rochin formula yearned for a better standard. And at least one
Justice openly questioned the "usefulness of 'conscience-shocking' as a legal test."'
III. Due Process and Rationality in Law Enforcement
In its original conception, due process referred to a general standard imposed on
government. The agents of the state were not to act against the life, liberty, and
property of the citizen except by regular, common-law procedures as defined by the
jurisdiction. As a matter of history and tradition, due process traces back to the
promise of the Magna Carta, which ensured that the sovereign's power could not
condemn a man to death (deprivation of life) or to prison (deprivation of liberty),
or to loss of land and holdings (deprivation of property) except by judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land.'
The opinion of the Court in Lewis does not survey the evidence regarding the
original understanding of "due process." For that matter, neither do the concurring
opinions of Justice Kennedy or Justice Scalia, which purport to defend using history
and tradition to define the reach of the due process guarantee, but which also
compound confusion by blurring the problem of defining what liberty interests
deserve close judicial attention and the undisputed fact that in Lewis, the victim
suffered a constitutionally cognizable loss, loss of life. As a fragment of evidence
relevant to the problem of arbitrary, unjustified, and lawless conduct causing death,
consider the following passage from Sir William Blackstone's commentaries:
This natural life being . . . the immediate donation of the great
creator, cannot legally be disposed of or destroyed by any individual,
neither by the person himself nor by any other of his fellow creatures,
merely upon their own authority. Yet nevertheless it may, by the
divine permission, be frequently forfeited for the breach of those laws
of society, which are enforced by the sanction of capital punish-
ments; .... [W]henever the constitution of a state vests in any man,
or body of men, a power of destroying at pleasure, without the
direction of laws, the lives or members of the subject, such constitution
is in the highest degree tyrannical: and that whenever any laws direct
such destruction for light and trivial causes, such laws are likewise
tyrannical, though in an inferior degree; because here the subject is
aware of the danger he is exposed to, and may by prudent caution
provide against it. The statute law of England does therefore very
seldom, and the common law does never, inflict any punishment
extending to life or limb, unless upon the highest necessity: and the
95. L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 1996).
96. Henera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 428 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
97. RAOUL BERGER, GOvERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 20-21, 195 (1977).
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constitution is an utter stranger to any arbitrary power of killing or
maiming the subject without the express warrant of law9
In the early years of the republic, the due process concept had already begun to
evolve. In his famous argument before the Supreme Court in Dartmouth College
v. Woodward," Daniel Webster spoke of due process as "law which hears before
it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry; and renders judgment only after
trial."'" Webster's description shows that due process was beginning to become
a more demanding standard, which imposed on government a duty to act with care,
deliberation,' and reasonableness, and not recklessly, arbitrarily, or in conscious
disregard of law. At that point in historical development of due process, Alexander
Hamilton's description of due process was still accurate: "The words 'due process'
have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process and
proceedings of the courts of justice; they can never be referred to an act of the
legislature.""I
In the late nineteenth century, however, due process began a strange metamor-
phosis into a phrase of "convenient vagueness."" After the Supreme Court
rejected the idea that the right to work was among the privileges and immunities of
citizenship in the Slaughterhouse Cases," the Supreme Court gradually
transformed due process into a doctrinal body of economic policies. Due process
became a means to evade Slaughterhouse and a flexible, potent protection for
corporations, businesses, and property rights. Specifically, the Justices ruled that due
process ensured the right to just compensation when the state exercises the power
of eminent domain;'" it protected "the right to pursue any livelihood or avocation,
and. . . to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essen-
tial"; 0 and it even secured the right for railroads to earn a fair profit from state-
98. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129-30, reprinted in Neil H. Cogan (ed.), THE
COMPLTE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFrs, DEBATEs, SOURCES & ORIGINS 359-60 (1997).
99. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
100. Il at 581.
101. The duty of deliberation and inquiry - a fair and appropriate decision-making process - prior
to a government's action against life, liberty, and property is the special office of procedural due process.
See generally, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). At
a minimum, the principles seek to "minimize the risk of erroneous decisions." Greenholtz v. Inmates of
Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979).
102. THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (H.C. Syrett & J.E. Cooke eds., 1962), quoted in
BERGER, supra note 97, at 194, 196 n.11. Professor Berger's chapter on due process is a skillful,
comprehensive collection of historical materials, in which he concludes: "Whether one can determine
'precisely' what due process meant, however, is not nearly so important as the fact that one thing quite
plainly it did not mean, in either 1789 or 1866; it did not comprehend judicial power to override
legislation on substantive or policy grounds." BERGER, supra note 97, at 193-94.
103. FEIx FRANKFURTER, MR. JusTicE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 19 (1938).
104. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (noting Louisiana did not interfere with disgruntled butchers'
rights under the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when the state created
a monopoly as a means of moving slaughterhouses out of New Orleans).
105. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 257-58 (1897).
106. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
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fixed railroad rates."°0 At approximately the same time in history, the Justices
chose to deny the more obvious procedural implications of the text, as they ruled
against jury trial rights, rights to counsel, and the rights against self-
incrimination."
As one historian put it,
[d]ue process was fashioned from the most respectable ideological stuff
of the later nineteenth century. The ideas out of which it was shaped
were in full accord with the dominant thought of the age. They were an
107. See Smith v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1898).
108. The striking contrast between the Court's unwillingness to amplify the procedural contributions
of due process and its enthusiasm for judicial review of legislative policy under "substantive due process"
notions is easily traced in even a rough timeline of decisions from the late nineteenth century and the
first half of the twentieth century: Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1877) (noting in dicta that
government price regulation might violate due process); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884)
(holding grand jury indictment or presentment is not an element of due process); Railroad Comm'n
Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886) (noting in dicta that states may not regulate in a way that amounts to
a taking of property for public use without just compensation, or without due process of law); Minnesota
Rate Case, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890) ("The question of reasonableness of a rate ... for transpor-
tation... [is] eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law .... ");
Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589 (holding liberty of contract is protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Smith v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898) (holding rate regulation must
guarantee fair return on present value); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 595-96 (1900) (holding trial by
jury may be modified by a state or abolished altogether, even in criminal cases); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (holding state regulation of bakers' work hours was an unreasonable interference
with liberty of contract); Adairv. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 176 (1908) (holding employers have Fifth
Amendment due process right to insist on contract that workers do not join unions, despite federal
statute); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908) (holding the privilege against self-incrimination
"is not fundamental in due process of law, nor an essential part of it"); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1,
26 (1915) (holding employers have Fourteenth Amendment due process right to insist on contract that
workers do not join unions, despite state statute); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 344-45 (1915)
(holding prisoner's allegations in habeas corpus petition that a trial, conviction, and death sentence was
the result of mob domination presented no issue of due process); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,403
(1923) (holding a law forbidding instruction in any modem language other than English unreasonably
interfered with parental freedoms to raise their children secured by due process); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding mandatory attendance in public schools unreasonably
interfered with parental liberty to send children to private schools); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08
(1927) (holding involuntary sterilization of inmates found to be afflicted with a heredity form of insanity
or imbecility did not violate due process); UnitedRys. v. West, 280 U.S. 234,252 (1930) (holding, based
on due process, a state-fixed rate for railway company allowing a rate of return of only 6.26% was
confiscatory; the company had a constitutional right to a return of 7.44% of the value of its assets);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding due process requires state to supply counsel to
indigent capital defendants); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (holding torture to obtain
confessions violates due process); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,243-44 (1936) (holding
due process guarantees fieedom of expression); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (same);
Palko V. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 364 (1937) (holding protection against double jeopardy is not
guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53,
56 (1947) (affirming Twining and Palko; ruling that prosecutorial comment on a defendant's silence is
not a violation of due process); Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (holding exclusionary rule
does not apply to state criminal proceedings).
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aspect of common sense, a standard of economic orthodoxy, a test of
straight thinking and sound opinion."c
However, this transformation of individualism, laissez faire, freedom of contract,
and social darwinism from (arguably) sound policy into constitutional mandates had
little to do with the historic meaning of due process. No matter. "Words on
parchment could not be adamant before so powerful a thrust.... [A]s a last resort,
a vague 'natural rights' as a higher law might have been found to permeate the
whole Constitution.""' The best known case of the era is, of course, the infamous
Lochner v. New York,' in which New York's regulation of the working hours of
bakers was struck down as offensive to freedom of contract as secured by the
transformed due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Great controver-
sy remains regarding why Lochner is so universally condemned as a form of
judicial sin, though there is little doubt about why it was decided. The Justices
condemned New York's labor law as "unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary.""
New York's regulatory strategy lacked "a more direct relation, as a means to an
end""' to its articulated health objectives, and its unarticulated objective of
promoting bargaining equality between employer and worker was deemed to be
illegitimate. In sum, after Lochner, statutes, the acts of legislatures, were arbitrary
in a constitutional sense, if they lacked sufficient justification."4
The familiar story of the Lochner era ends - or seems to end - when the
Supreme Court throws out most of this so-called "economic due process" doctrine
after the Great Depression and the New Deal reconstruct attitudes about the proper
role of government." Ordinary government measures have sufficient justification
if a legislator had a rational basis for concluding that a law furthered legitimate
objects, including health, welfare, morals, or even equality."6 Put another way,
such laws were not arbitrary, because they had a rational justification. Judicial
activism regarding economic regulations and social welfare measures receded, but
the "arbitrary" standard did not die. Substantive due process was temporarily
109. Walton H. Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw:
HIsTORICAL ESSAYS 131, 153 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966).
110. Id.
111. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
112. Id. at 56.
113. l.
114. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (noting ordinance violates
due process only if it is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (holding that
the challenged statute "is arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of
the State").
115. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-64 (1992).
116. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (refusing "to sit as a 'superlegislature to
weigh the wisdom of legislation'") (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423
(1952)); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("[T]he existence of facts
supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed."); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,
398 (1937) (noting as long as legislative responses are not arbitrary or capricious, judges should refrain
from reviewing wisdom of laws) (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934)).
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dormant but potent as a warrant for judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of other
laws. And the doctrine bore new and different tasting fruit in the last half of the
twentieth century. Judicial deference was to be the rule, but some powerful
exceptions were devised to protect individual autonomy in an increasingly powerful
welfare state."7
Nothing in Lewis contradicts or even questions this account of history. And so,
Justice Souter could see a constant theme even in a changing, expanding,
transformed doctrine: "Since the time of our early explanations of due process, we
have understood the core of the concept to be protection against arbitrary
action. ' '". To explain and summarize the development of due process, Souter
quoted from two nineteenth century decisions that purported to state "[t]he principal
and true meaning of the phrase":" 9
As to the words from Magna Charta, incorporated into the Constitution
of Maryland, after volumes spoken and written with a view to their
exposition, the good sense of mankind has at last settled down to this:
that they were intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary
exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established
principles of private right and distributive justice.'"
Modem cases, including the classic decisions recognizing a right of privacy, also
.teach that due process and the interests it protects form a "a rational continuum
which broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints.'' Much of this rhetoric was devoted to
117. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,454 n.17, 458 (1993)
(plurality opinion) (noting substantive due process principles continue to place some limits against
punitive damages that are "plainly arbitrary and oppressive," and "'general concern of reasonableness...
properly enter into the constitutional calculus'") (quoting Pacific Mutual Life Ins., Co. v. Halsip, 499 U.S.
1, 18 (1991)); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1977) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting)); see also TXO Prod. Corp., 509 U.S. at 467 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that the Constitution's "fundamental guarantee is that the individual citizen may rest
secure against arbitrary or irrational deprivations of property"). But see id. at 443 (O'Connor, J.
dissenting) (urging "sufficient constitutional scrutiny to restore fairness in what is rapidly becoming an
arbitrary and oppressive system"); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)
("mhe question ... is whether... the University acted arbitrarily."); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 558 (1974) ("Ihe touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action
of government.").
118. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998).
119. kd at 845 (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819)).
120. IL (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884). In Lewis, Justice Souter also
cited several other precedents in support of the idea that "the touchstone of due process is protection of
the individual against arbitrary action of government." Id. (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
558 (1974)); see also, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (explaining that the
substantive due process guarantee protects against government power arbitrarily and oppressively
exercised); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) (noting the procedural due process guarantee
protects against "arbitrary takings").
121. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,502 (1977) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,543
(1961) (Harlan, J. dissenting)).
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justifying judicial review of the substance of legislative policy, not procedure. Yet,
as Judge Richard Posner has written, substantive due process still
stinks in the nostrils of modem liberals and modem conservatives alike,
because of its association with Dred Scott's case[" ] and with Lochner
and the other freedom of contract cases, because of its formlessness ....
and because it makes a poor match with the right to notice and hearing
that is the procedural content of the clause."
In sum, despite the evolving content of constitutional doctrine, and its changing
focus, the Supreme Court has never wavered in its conclusion that the core principle
of due process protects the individual from arbitrary government action."2 Before
and after Lochner, in Collins, and even in Lewis, the word "arbitrary" - never
explicitly defined - has been a favorite tool for defining the essence of substantive
due process."2 Until Lewis fused the phrase "arbitrary in a constitutional sense"
with "conscience-shocking," there was little reason to suppose that the meaning of
the word differed from the many other occasions when federal courts defined due
process as a general prohibition against arbitrary restraints. Blacks's Law Dictionary
offers a number of definitions:
* "In an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done capriciously or at
pleasure."
- "Without adequate determining principle; not founded in the nature
of things; nonrational; not done or acting according to reason or
judgment; depending on the will alone; absolutely in power; capricious-
ly;
* "tyrannical; despotic;
* "Without fair, solid, and substantial cause; that is, without cause
based upon the law .... ; not governed by any fixed rules or standard."
- "Willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and regard
for facts and circumstances presented."
- "Ordinarily, 'arbitrary' is synonymous with bad faith or failure to
exercise honest judgment and an arbitrary act would be one performed
122. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
123. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 179-80 (1995).
124. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
125. Compare, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring)
("Those who won our independence believed... that in its government the deliberative forces should
prevail over the arbitrary.") with WALTER LIPPMANN, THE GOOD SOCIETY ch. 15 (1937), reprinted in
THE ESSENTIAL LIPPMANN: A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 172-73 (Clinton
Rossiter & James Lare eds., 1963) ("rhe denial that men may be arbitrary in human transactions is the
higher law .... By this higher law all formal laws and all political behavior are judged in civil
societies .... If the sovereign himself may not act willfully, arbitrarily, by personal prerogative, then no
one may. His ministers may not. The legislature may not. Majorities may not. ... This law which is
the spirit of law is the opposite of an accumulation of old precedents and new fiats. By this higher law,
that men must not be arbitrary, the old law is continually tested and the new law reviewed.").
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without adequate determination of principle and one not founded in
nature of things.""
Despite the multiplicity of definitional phrases, there are, at least, two distinct
themes. First, arbitrary conduct is capricious, irrational and without "fair, solid and
substantial cause." In a second sense, arbitrary conduct is tyrannical, despotic or
oppressive." None of the words seem to confine the definition of "arbitrary" to
intentional murder or torture.
The distinction between substance and procedure is not always clear and
sharp." Unrecognized in Lewis is the fact that the police speeding cases -
though characterized as substantive due process cases - have more to do with the
procedure by which the executive branches act than the policies of law enforcement
selected by majorities. In this sense, police recklessness implicates the original
values of due process, if not the specific original understandings of the clause. In
simplest terms, the core of the due process clause is a command directed to the law
enforcement authority of the community that no life, liberty, or property is to be
taken except by lawful judicial procedure." When focused on issues of law
enforcement procedure, due process rests securely on the notion that it takes "no
violent stretching of democratic theory to suppose an expectation on the part of the
people that, in employing the criminal sanction, the political branches would abide
the judge's sense of what was mete and decent in the way of procedure, just as they
abided the discretion of the jury. ' " Due process "must be a specialized respon-
sibility within the competence of the judiciary on which they do not bend before
political branches of the Government, as they should on matters of policy which
compromise substantive law."''
Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion in Lewis that conceded that the "shock
the conscience" phrase "has the unfortunate connotation of a standard laden with
126. BLACK'S LAW DicnONARY 104-05 (6th ed. 1990).
127. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 110 (1971) (defining "arbitrary" as "arising from unrestrained exercise of the will, caprice,
or personal preference," "based on random or convenient selection or choice rather than on reason or
nature," "given to willful irrational choices and demands," or "characterized by absolute power or
authority: despotic, tyrannical").
128. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Generalizing the Trial Model of Procedural Due Process: A New
Basisfor the Right to Treatment, 17 HARv. C.R.-CL. L. REV. 61, 68-69 (1982); see also, e.g., JERRY L.
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 5 (1985) (stating that questions of substance
and process are "functionally inseparable").
129. There is, of course, great controversy about the procedural content of the due process clause
as originally conceived and understood. Professor Berger concludes that "Ydlue process' should... be
regarded as shorthand for Coke's 'by the due course and process of law' in judicial proceedings."
BERGER, supra note 97, at 198-99. His narrow interpretation contrasts with other scholars who believe
"the history of due process shows that it did mean trial by jury and many of the other traditional
rights.., specified separately in the Bill of Rights." LEONARD W. LEvY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS IN
CONSTTUTIONAL HISTORY 66 (1972).
130. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 32 (1970).
131. Shaughnessy v. United States exrel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,224 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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subjective assessments."'3 He recommended "considerable skepticism" about
trusting the "conscience-shocking" formula, which the concurring opinion seems to
undermine by suggesting that "the test can be used to mark the beginning point in
asking whether or not the objective character of certain conduct is consistent with
our traditions, precedents, and historical understanding of the Constitution and its
meaning."'33 If "conscience-shocking" is only a beginning point and not an end of
analysis, Justice Kennedy's opinion may suggest that a different compromise is
possible. He recommended a unitary approach based on "objective considerations,
including history and precedent . . . regardless of whether the State's action is
legislative or executive in character.""I Such an approach - well-established,
traditional, and consistent with other due process analysis - is the modem
formulation of the "arbitrary" standard, the rational basis test.
In Lewis, the Court should have ruled that governmental action depriving a person
of life or bodily integrity'35 is arbitrary in a constitutional sense, if reckless
conduct is "without any reasonable justification in service of a legitimate
governmental objective."'" Applied to a case like Lewis, a rationality standard
would ensure that due process guarantees are not violated when police or other law
enforcement officials make poor judgment calls in emergency situations.37 Yet it
would also permit the possibility of liability - and incentives for training and
care - if a police officer kills or injures a person because of recklessly dangerous
conduct in a nonemergency situation without plausible or rational justification.
To appreciate the impact of a rationality standard, consider the following case.'
A police officer hears a radio call requesting backup assistance in the early hours
of the morning. There is no emergency. He knows other officers are also
responding to the call. The officer drives his vehicle in excess of seventy miles per
hour in zones with a posted maximum of thirty-five mph on a major city boulevard
that intersects with several other major boulevards. He drives without sirens and
without lights. At one intersection, he drives through a red light and collides with
a vehicle operated by a young man who is driving safely and had the green light
and the right of way. The victim is not negligent and he has nothing whatever to
do with the events leading to the call of the officer requesting assistance. The
132. County to Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 858.
135. In Lewis, the beginning point of analysis was clear: a person suffered loss of constitutionally
protected interests in life and liberty. The loss required no judicial search for fundamental values, as in
privacy and abortion cases, and it required no second-guessing of the substance of a statute adopted by
the ordinary majoritarian processes of representative government. Id. at 857.
136. Id. at 856.
137. See, e.g., Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567,575-76 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding though a government
agency's affirmative acts created or increased danger of violence from a private third party, its acts were
not capricious, not irrational, not arbitrary because they were a typical and reasonable response to
declining funds and scarce resources).
138. The case is hypothetical, though it is loosely based on the plaintiff's allegations in Williams
v. Denver, 99 F.3d 1009 (10th Cir. 1996). The facts have been altered to provide a clearer and more
persuasive basis for the hypothetical plaintiffs claim.
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officer's driving violates both state law and written department procedures for
emergency driving. Specifically, both state law and department policy require
emergency vehicles to use lights and sirens and to slow down before entering
controlled intersections if they are otherwise violating traffic laws. The policies also
specifically forbid speeding in nonemergency situations. The officer acknowledges
that he knows the applicable policies and that he had no justification for his
speeding. Even worse, he has a poor driving record as an officer. He has caused
nonfatal wrecks before.
To resolve this case, one need not develop a principle that would make every
ordinary accident involving police a federal case. "The key word is 'accident."""
Due process requires proof of more than inadvertence, inattention, or negligence.
As the Supreme Court stated in Daniels v. Williams, "the Due Process Clause is
simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of
or injury to life, liberty, or property."'" The holding of Daniels has roots in the
warnings of the Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis.' Neither section 1983 nor the
Fourteenth Amendment should become "a font of tort law to be superimposed upon
whatever systems may already be administered by the States."'42 In Paul, the
Court anticipated constitutional claims arising from negligent driving of law
enforcement officers:
And since it is surely far more clear from the language of the Four-
teenth Amendment that "life" is protected from state deprivation than it
is that reputation is protected against state injury, it would be difficult
to see why the survivors of an innocent bystander.., negligently killed
by a sheriff driving a government vehicle, would not have claims
equally cognizable under [section] 1983.
It is hard to perceive any logical stopping place to such a line of
reasoning. Respondent's construction would seem almost necessarily to
result in every legally cognizable injury which may have been inflicted
by a state official acting under "color of law" establishing a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. We think it would come as a great surprise
to those who drafted and shepherded the adoption of that Amendment
to learn that it worked such a result .... "
139. Hill v. Shobe, 93 F.3d 418, 421 n.2 (7th Cir. 1996); see also, e.g., Apodaca v. Rio Arriba
County Sheriffs Dep't, 905 F.2d 1445, 1447 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding "negligent operation of a vehicle
by a police officer does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation"); Cannon v. Taylor, 782 F.2d
947, 950 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Automobile negligence actions are grist for the state law mill. But they do
not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation.").
140. 474 U.S. 327, 333-34 (1986); see also, e.g., Collins v. Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115,
129-30 (1992) (holding that allegations of negligence or omissions do not state a claim for arbitrary
misconduct in violation of the Due Process Clause).
141. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
142. 1&. at 701.
143. Il at 698-99.
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One need not doubt the wisdom of the Paul holding or the Court's speculations
about the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to suggest that a reckless
killing without rational justification is quite different. Not only is it the sort of
incident that might be featured in a novel by Hugo or Dickens, it is the sort of
arbitrary behavior that inspired the Magna Carta itself, and its restraints of law
against the oppressive discretion of the Crown's agents." Two steps seem
sufficient to guard against the Court's fears as expressed in Daniels and Paul. To
avoid an avalanche of constitutional tort litigation, courts need, first, to require proof
of reckless intent or deliberate indifference." Almost all courts seem to conclude
that the inquiry is, at least in part, a subjective inquiry into the state actor's actual
thinking at the time of the alleged constitutional violation."
Second, courts should insist that the recklessness occur in a nonemergency
situation, or in circumstances lacking any rational justification. The dual element
test should suffice to protect law enforcement from the all-too-tempting second-
guess. The judgment call responding to some perceived urgency - even if
questionable or controversial or even wrong - deserves the benefit of presumed
144. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
145. Judicial definitions of "reckless conduct" seem to follow similar, though not identical, patterns
of assessing both objective factors - such as the degree or unreasonableness of risk - and subjective
factors - such as awareness, knowledge, and intent. For example, according to the American Law
Institute:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act
or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or
having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only
that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that
such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). The Model Penal Code offered the following definition
of "reckless" conduct to determine culpability under criminal law:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists
or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that,
considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known
to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
146. Compare, e.g., Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997) ("'[D]eliberate indifference'
is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious
consequence of his or her action ... .") with id. at 449 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Deliberate indifference
is thus treated, as it is elsewhere in the law, as tantamount to intent, so that inaction by a policymaker
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm is equivalent to the intentional action that setting
policy presupposes."). See, e.g., Hill v. Shobe, 93 F.3d 418, 421 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that culpability
standard requires proof a defendant is criminally reckless, which is a proxy for intent); Leffall v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 531 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating deliberate indifference suffices to state a
substantive due process claim); Archuleta v. McShan, 897 F.2d 495, 499 (10th Cir. 1990)
("[R]ecklessness includes an element of deliberateness - a conscious acceptance of a known, serious
risk."); Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1219 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (defining recklessness
as containing an intent component because reckless disregard of a great risk is a form of knowledge or
intent), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
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rationality and constitutionality. Without such presumptions, due process standards
will not reflect the realities of law enforcement. Authentic emergency supplies a
rational basis in police chase cases.
Police chases are not only a necessary concomitant of maintaining order
in our modem society, but they are also inherently hazardous. By their
very nature, they inevitably create some risk of injury to bystanders.
Officers must decide the balance between law enforcement and risk to
public safety quickly and while under considerable pressure. In such
circumstances, permitting the Due Process Clause to serve as a
surrogate for state tort law would hamstring the police in their perfor-
mance of vital duties. 7
On the other hand, in the absence of emergency or some other rational
justification, it is hard to imagine what constitutional value or purpose is achieved
by tolerating police recklessness without any plausible warrant. The result is hard
to square with the principle that government must not deprive the individual of life
except by resort to judicial proceedings. Unwarranted or irrational recklessness is
worse than a mistake; it seems to be a deliberate disregard for legal and
constitutional duty. If anything, the burden of this interpretation will fall most
heavily on police and executive law-enforcing authority,'48 the intended targets of
the due process obligation, rather than the legislature's law-making power, which
was not a target.'49 However, consistent with Justice Kennedy's sentiments in his
concurring opinion in Lewis, a dual standard would operate in approximately the
same way regardless of whether legislative policy or executive action was at issue.
It would do no harm to the time-honored "presumption that the administration of
government programs [be] based on a rational decisionmaking process.""
147. Evans v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1038 (Ist Cir. 1996) (finding officers' decision to pursue based
on good cause to believe the suspects were trafficking in cocaine).
148. The phrase "due process of law," and its origins in the purposes of the "law of the land"
language of the Magna Charta, reflect the desire that government's law enforcement mechanisms could
not act against life, liberty, or property of the individual except through "regularized common law
procedures, especially grand jury accusation and trial by jury." LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT
AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTTUTON 273 (1988); see also, e.g., BERGER, supra note 97, at 198-99 ("due
process was not a catchall for all other safeguards that the Bill of Rights provided to a defendant; it had
a special and limited function: to insure through service of proper, that is, 'due', process that a defendant
would be given a chance to answer."). In short, despite the differences in academic interpretations of due
process, it is common ground that law enforcement was to proceed through ordinary judicial procedures,
and not on its own arbitrary initiative.
149. "The words 'due process' have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process
and proceedings of the courts of justice; they can never be referred to an act of the legislature." THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (H.C. Syrett & LE. Cooke eds., 1962), quoted in BERGER, supra
note 97, at 194 n.4 (emphasis added by Berger).
150. Collins v. Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992).
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Conclusion
In a historical context, the opinion of the Court in Lewis, though firm, clear, and
unanimous, remains deeply unsatisfying as an explanation of the Justices' preferred
values and doctrinal emphasis. The Justices reaffirmed the principle that
government must not be arbitrary, but it turned away from the traditional, legal, and
literal meanings of the word "arbitrary." The Justices announced that the doctrines
of due process require one set of formulae for reviewing legislation and quite
another for the conduct of the executive, with hardly an explanation of why a
differential standard emerges from the phrase "due process" or its history. Finally,
by adopting a newer, clearer, more rigid formulation of the "conscience-shocking"
test, one that seems to require a specific intent to brutalize and harm, the Justices
failed to take account of cases in which police act savagely, with raw power, but
without thought or justification.
One of the essential elements of the Jeffersonian faith is belief in the moral sense
of the common man. Writing from Paris at approximately the same time as the
federal convention was completing its work on the Constitution, Thomas Jefferson
argued: "State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide
it as well, and often the better... because he has not been led astray by artificial
rules."'' These Jeffersonian sentiments speak ambiguously to Lewis. On the one
hand, they counsel against unilateral judicial resolution of the moral case implicit
in a police speeding tragedy, and in favor of allowing the political system to
develop the remedies, if any, afforded to the victims of police recklessness." On
the other hand, if one was to state the moral and legal case to the ploughman, the
baker, the homemaker, or the mother and ask, "Which problem is a question of due
process: Reckless police speeding causing fatalities? Or birth control, abortion,
parenting, sexual intimacy, and family living arrangements?" A thoughtful person
blessed with more common sense than legal learning just might conclude that the
accretions in due process doctrines have the wrong emphasis and that the entire
subject, and subjectivity, of "substantive due process" is one example when judges,
lawyers, and professors have been led astray by artificial rules.
151. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787) reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON,
WRrrGs (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
152. Jefferson was speaking of professors of moral philosophy, not professors of law and not
lawyers. But see Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (reasoning regulation of individual choices to die should be left to representative government
because "[iut is quite impossible (because the Constitution says nothing about the matter) that [majorities]
will decide upon a line less lawful than the one [the Justices] would choose; and it is unlikely (because
we know no more about 'life and death' than they do) that they will decide upon a line less reasonable").
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